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NOTE
INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Dear Aunt , *
I've learned so much about Indians recently that I wanted to share some
things with you and ask your opinion. My friends and I, with the encour-
agement of some remarkable Indians, have discussed the issues, starting
with the basic questions of what to do about hazardous waste and whether
Indian tribes should be allowed to regulate waste dumps on their reserva-
tions. These questions have stimulated other inquiries. Specifically, under
federal statutes, may they operate waste facilities? Do the environmental
statutes allow Indians to regulate themselves? How does the "trust rela-
tionship," the traditional association between the white man and the In-
dian which encourages Indian sovereignty and self-determination, affect
the environmental statutes passed by Congress? Morally, is it right to al-
low Indians to accept waste? Are they prepared to handle it safely? Are
the Indians sufficiently aware of the problems that might arise which
could permanently damage the only land they have? We start with these
questions, move to all corners of the earth, it seems, in discussing potential
solutions, and then end up right back where we started. If it is immoral for
the white man to dump his trash on the Indians, then perhaps a way can
be found to pay for any loss or injury to the Indians that the trash gener-
ates. But this solution-seeking itself takes away from the Indians' rights to
self-determination: the white man is still looking over the Indians' shoul-
ders to save them from potential disaster. As of now, we've found no per-
fect solution.
A little background on the legal history of the American Indians might
help. It seems that as soon as the white man set foot in the "new world"
and brought with him his laws, the less powerful Indians were relegated by
the white man to "outsider jurisprudence." Jurisprudence is commonly
known as "the science or philosophy of law."1 The legal definition delves
deeper and notes the significance of the community in jurisprudential de-
cisions: jurisprudence attempts to consider the effect of each potential
rule on the multitude of similar cases that may follow, and to choose the
* The author had in mind her great-aunt Hattie Miller, when she wrote this article. The
reader is invited to fill in any name she or he chooses.
1. RANDOM HousE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1039 (2d ed. 1987).
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rule that produces "the greatest advantage to the community. ' But a
problem arises when one judicial system must set rules for several distinct
and sometimes inharmonious communities. If the judicial system is domi-
nated by one community, as ours is by the white man, then that commu-
nity is most likely to enjoy the greatest benefits from the decisions, proba-
bly to the detriment of the "outsider" communities.
One Indian legal scholar describes outsider jurisprudence as "a common
struggle against a dominant vision of law which we all experience as alien
and alienating with respect to our visions of self and community. "'3 Indeed,
many groups including gays, lesbians, feminists and people of color, are
"outside" the Euro-American community of white man jurisprudence and
are fighting to have their perceptions of the world and the laws included in
our country's legal system.
4
The quintessential example of insider/outsider jurisprudence is the way
in which the white man treated the Indians and removed them from their
land. The "Marshall trilogy,"5 which consists of three early Supreme Court
cases written by Chief Justice Marshall, began this removal. The first of
these cases, Johnson v. M'Intosh, dealt with the right of Indians to give or
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (6th ed. 1990). The applicable portion of the definition
follows:
[Wi]hen a new or doubtful case arises to which two different rules seem, when taken
literally, to be equally applicable, it may be, and often is, the function of jurispru-
dence to consider the ultimate effect which would be produced if each rule were ap-
plied to an indefinite number of similar cases, and to choose that rule which, when so
applied, will produce the greatest advantage to the community.
Id.
3. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Criti-
cal Legal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 103, 133 (1987).
4. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Gendered Checks and Balances: Understanding the Leg-
acy of White Patriarchy in an American Indian Cultural Context, 24 GA. L. REV. 1019,
1019 (1990). "There is an outsider's jurisprudence growing and thriving alongside main-
stream jurisprudence in American law schools. The new feminist jurisprudence is a lively
example of this. A related, less celebrated, outsider jurisprudence is that belonging to people
of color." Id. at n.1 (quoting Mari Matsuda, Public Responses to Racist Speech: Consider-
ing the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2323 (1989)).
5. The Marshall trilogy is composed of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 572 (1823) (In-
dians could not pass title to land absent the consent of the United States government);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (Cherokee Nation was held not to be a foreign
nation so that the United States Supreme Court did not have original jurisdiction under
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution; however, the Court commented favorably on the
plaintiff's claim and described the tribes as "domestic dependent nations" resembling a
"ward to his guardian"); and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (States can have no
jurisdiction in Indian country except under the treaties or acts of Congress).
Georgia has recently pardoned Samuel Austin Worcester and Elihu Butler, missionaries
who attempted to help the Cherokees in the early 1800s. The pardon acknowledges that
Georgia usurped Cherokee sovereignty and ignored United States Supreme Court orders
that would have precluded the removal of Cherokees from their land. Cherokee Land Mis-
take Is Admitted, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 1992, at A3.
Analysis of Cherokee Nation and Worcester is beyond the scope of this paper.
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sell land.6 Marshall reviewed the nature of European discovery and con-
quest, stating that
the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely
disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, im-
paired. . . . [T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as independent
nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of
the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by
the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave exclusive ti-
tle to those who made it.7
In other words, since colonists "discovered" the land, they got exclusive
title to it by virtue of discovery. Marshall stated that "[t]he history of
America, from its discovery to the present day, proves, we think, the uni-
versal recognition of these principles."8 "Universal recognition" by the
white man, perhaps. The Supreme, Court's universe did not include the
Indians and other native peoples "discovered" and "conquered" by the
European nations. These outsiders had no say in the white man's
jurisprudence.
Even if discovery and conquest were the principles upon which the na-
tion had been built, the United States Supreme Court certainly could have
rejected them. Although the legal world is built upon precedent, it is not
uncommon for the Supreme Court to turn the law upside down with opin-
ions reversing a long line of legal theory.
Chief Justice Marshall further reasoned that "discovery gave an exclu-
sive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase
or by conquest."9 This reasoning totally ignores the fact that the Indians
already occupied the new world! The Indians had already "discovered" the
land. What Marshall says is essentially that might makes right. What the
strong white man wants, he takes. Nowhere does Chief Justice Marshall
consider the Indians' views, how Indians will be affected by the Supreme
Court decisions, or whether the white man has a moral right to take ex-
actly what he wants. The Indians are totally outside the picture. Every-
thing is observed from the white man's point of view. 10
This is how the story goes: the white man arrives and moves into the
Indians' land. With better weapons, the white man overpowers the Indians
and, using the white man's laws, takes for restricted use, by limited num-
bers of white men, the land that had been inexhaustible and bountiful
under the Indians' stewardship. Land that had completely satisfied the
Indians' needs was now parceled out to individual landowners, preventing
use and enjoyment by others. The white man did not attempt to under-
6. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 572.
7. Id. at 574.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 587.
10. The arrogance of the white man was prominently displayed in Johnson v. M'Intosh.
Today, it is questionable whether this arrogance has receded, or whether the insider juris-
prudence of the American legal system continues to ignore any point of view other than that
of the white man.
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stand the unfamiliar Indian culture and stewardship of the land. Instead,
he imposed upon the natives his own patriarchal modes of life and legal
thought. While escaping the tyranny of the English king in the old coun-
try, the white man brought his own tyranny to the new world and imposed
it upon the Indians through legal doctrines of discovery and conquest, re-
serving the promised rights of Indian sovereignty for times when it suited
the white man.
Some observers disagree with this negative view of these Supreme Court
decisions and believe that the decisions in the Marshall trilogy gave the
Indians a good basis of protection in the American legal system. These
observers believe there is a difference between the history of the white
man's dealings with the Indians and the legal principles that came out of
that history." For example, the Marshall trilogy creates for the Indians 1)
an independent nature of the tribes, although still under the federal gov-
ernment, 2) a trust relationship between the tribes and the federal govern-
ment, and 3) limitations on state authority such that states have no juris-
diction in Indian country absent explicit federal authorization.2 These
observers believe that such legal principles protected the Indians' sover-
eign rights, although admittedly under the auspices of the United States
government.
Relatively recent Indian law cases, however, have chipped away at these
protections.3 It is now questionable whether, on their own reservations,
Indians have jurisdiction over the lands owned by non-Indians. This juris-
dictional uncertainty creates interesting problems. For example, environ-
mental regulation must be consistent throughout a region in order to be
effective. If the Indian landowner on one side of a creek is subject to dif-
ferent pollution laws from the non-Indian landowner on the other side,
and this is true every few acres throughout the reservation, the overall
beneficial impact of the more stringent regulation is diminished.
If we accept that white man's law and culture was the best and only
system that could have been imposed on the new world, and that no com-
promise of the doctrines of discovery and conquest was feasible, then per-
haps the Marshall trilogy provided fair protection to the Indians. Indeed,
those decisions cannot be changed at this late date. Is it not feasible, how-
ever, that Marshall and the Supreme Court could have come to a different
conclusion? Maybe the white man could have compromised with the Indi-
ans and the white man could have lived on reservations. Maybe the white
man and Indian tribes could have made treaties agreeing that the white
man would never allow his progressive, technological road to the future to
11. W. Richard West, Jr., Director, National Museum of the American Indians, Smithso-
nian Institution, Remarks as Allen Chair Visiting Professor at the University of Richmond,
T.C. Williams School of Law (Jan. 29, 1992).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accom-
panying notes 88-110.
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pollute or damage in any way the pristine lands of the Indians. These
ideas most certainly were never considered.
Instead, fear motivated the white man' to dominate the Indians. Mar-
shall described the Indians as "fierce savages . . . brave and high spirited
ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence. ' 14 Nev-
ertheless, the white man's greater power allowed him to conquer the new
world and take the land and the resources for himself, without negotia-
tions with Indian outsiders whose ways and laws were different. Thus, the
Indians were pushed out. Marshall reasoned thdt:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of
an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has
been asserted in the first instance, and afterwards sustained; if a
country has been acquired and held under it; if the property of the
great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of
the land, and cannot be questioned. . . . However this restriction
may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civilized na-
tions, yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which the
country has been settled, and be adapted. to the actual condition of
the two people, it may, perhaps, be supported by reason, and cer-
tainly cannot be rejected by courts of justice.'5
This passage seems to say, "well, perhaps taking the Indian land wasn't
moral, but we did it and have lived with it this long, so we won't change it
now." But the courts of justice could have rejected the discovery and con-
quest doctrines. The Supreme Court had at least two choices in determin-
ing the outcome of Johnson v. M'Intosh, and it chose the white man's in-
sider jurisprudence. Had the Supreme Court the foresight to consider the
Indian point of view, perhaps the entire problem of insider/outsider juris-
prudence would not be at issue in our country today. Everyone, regardless
of race, sex, creed, or sexual preference, might have their own place inside
our system of jurisprudence.
Since the time of the Marshall trilogy, the United States government
has attempted to assimilate and relocate Indian tribes and people. The
government has also terminated the government-recognized status of
many Indian tribes.18 The white man's wisdom claimed it would be socially
14. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823).
15. Id. at 591-92.
16. Although most governmental and legal intervention in Indian affairs has reduced In-
dian self-determination, not all intervention has ignored the unique circumstances and
needs of the Indian people. For example, courts recognized that Indians were at a bargain-
ing disadvantage when it came to the English language. To resolve this inequity, the courts
created a rule of construction holding that ambiguous terms in a treaty must be construed
in favor of the tribe or in the manner that the Indians would most likely have interpreted it.
See United States v. Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 531-32 (1900). From 1790 to 1834, Con-
gress passed Indian Trade and Intercourse acts to protect the tribes from non-governmental
third parties. Under these acts, non-Indians had to have a license to trade with Indians on
their lands, and purchase of Indian land was invalid unless it was made pursuant to a treaty
or congressional action. See Oneida Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-72
(1974). Finally, in recent years, Congress has recognized that Indian tribes should have the
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integrating for the Indians to learn to farm,17 to become educated and
option of political self-determination and economic self-sufficiency. Resulting legislation in-
cludes the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 450-458e (Law. Co-op. 1992)).
For an overview of the struggles of Indians in Canada, the United States and Latin
America to achieve self-government, see Michael S. Serrill, Struggling to Be Themselves,
TIME, Nov. 9, 1992, at 52.
17. See generally General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (1983)). The General Allot-
ment Act empowered
the Bureau of Indian Affairs to allot 160 acres of tribal land to each head of house-
hold and forty acres to each minor. Allotments were originally to remain in trust for
twenty-five years, where they would be immune from local property taxes during the
period of transition from being a tribally owned communal resource to an individu-
ally owned piece of land managed and used like surrounding non-Indian farms and
ranches.
The allotment policy is best understood, perhaps, when analogized to a land reform
policy imposed from the top down without tribal input and consent; a policy grossly
undercapitalized, providing as little as ten dollars and less per allottee for imple-
ments, seeds, and instruction; a policy insensitive to the hunting and food gathering
traditions of non-agricultural tribes; and a policy devoid of any cultural understand-
ing of the roles of the tiyospaye (e.g., the extended family of the Lakota) in which the
allotments that were often assigned to individuals were located outside their home
communities beyond their natural habitat. ...
The results were truly devastating. The national Indian land estate was reduced
from 138 million acres in 1887 to fifty-two million acres in 1934. More than twenty-
six million acres of allotted land was transferred from the tribe to individual Indian
allottees and then passed to non-Indians through sale, fraud, mortgage foreclosures
and tax sales.
• . . [T]hirty-eight million acres of unallotted tribal lands were declared "surplus"
to Indian needs and were ceded to the federal government for sale to non-Indians.
The federal government opened to homesteading another twenty-two million acres of
"surplus" tribal land. ...
These ravages had equally scarring collateral effects. For the first time, the reserva-
tions became checkerboarded with tribal, individual Indian, individual non-Indian,
and corporate ownership. Individual Indian allotments quickly fractionated within
two or three generations, often resulting in dozens or -even hundreds of heirs. Even
land that remained in trust was more often leased to non-Indians than uses by the
allottees.
.. . Some commentators have argued that when the reservations were opened, true
traditional governments were essentially doomed in most tribes, and the authority of
any form of tribal government was undermined. The great influx of non-Indian set-
tlers coupled with the loss of communal lands and the attendant yoke of federal sup-
port of these policies simply eradicated much of the tribes' ability to govern. And in
the resulting void, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, in league with Christian missionaries,
became the true power brokers and the de facto governing forces.
The missionaries, in particular, wreaked a debilitating havoc with their religious
and educational programs, particularly the boarding school program which took In-
dian children away from their families for substantial periods of time and specifically
forbade the speaking of tribal languages in school. Under these circumstances, it is
not difficult to perceive the strain and pressure placed on traditional culture. This is
even more apparent when these policies were joined to Bureau of Indian Affairs di-
[Vol. 27:371
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learn the white man's ways, and to benefit from the white man's culture.18
Despite the government's efforts, these attempts failed to divest the Indi-
ans of their heritage. The government took Indian children to be educated
at "white" schools, hoping to bring them up in the American way of life.19
rectives outlawing traditional religious practices such as the Sun Dance. As a result,
the heart of the culture was driven underground into a shadow existence.
Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REv.
246, 255-57 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
18. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) ended the period of allotment, en-
couraged tribal governments to adopt constitutions and bylaws, and regulated the manage-
ment of Indian forests and grazing lands. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48
Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-78 (1983)). As one commentator
noted,
The reforms of the IRA, including explicit authorization and assistance in the adop-
tion of tribal constitutions, sought to engender recovery from stultification. Yet the
"new" opportunity held out in the IRA with its notion of "modern" tribal govern-
ment was, and is, often perceived on the reservation as further evisceration of tradi-
tional tribal government with its emphasis on the "white man's way" of elections,
English, and the written word.
Pommersheim, supra note 17, at 258, Other commentators write of the IRA:
[A]lmost immediately in 1934 federal land-management authorities began-to manipu-
late the tribal economies, which had evolved to accommodate traditional needs and
environmental conditions. Stock-reduction programs were initiated to alleviate what
was termed "overgrazing." These programs - applied against Indians, not against
non-Indian ranchers leasing reservation land for grazing - were set into motion and,
since 1935, more than half of all Indian livestock resources have been eliminated.
Ward Churchill & Winona LaDuke, Radioactive Colonization and the Native American,
JOURNALIST REV., May-June 1985, at 95, 98.
19. A member of the Ojibway tribe recalls his experiences in the white schools:
I was forced to go to a BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs] boarding school and also to a
Catholic mission school. I don't know which of these schools I remember more fondly.
At the Catholic mission school we were made to sit in a room, all facing towards the
front, and the good kind loving sister stood up there and she taught whatever it was
she was teaching us. I hardly ever understood. When it came time to answer ques-
tions, she would say, "Edward, stand up and tell me, who was the King of Spain in
1492?" And I would stand up and say, "I don't know." Only I would say it in Ojib-
way, not English - for which I was summarily snatched by the ear and marched up
in front of the room and told to stretch out my hands, palms down, and the good
kind loving sister would hit the backs of my hands twelve times with her yardstick.
That was repeated almost daily. I never did learn who the hell the King of Spain was.
Maybe I should have. Maybe my little finger would be straight now. . . .And then
there was the BIA boarding school. I happened to go to a very endearing institution
called the Pipestone Indian Training School. I'll never forget my first day there. We'd
been riding on a school bus the better part of the day from Wisconsin to southwest-
ern Minnesota, and we arrived at Pipestone around midnight. I thought for sure they
would feed us - but they didn't do that. They marched us all, boys in one direction
and girls in the other, and the first stop was this little room that had four chairs in it.
And there everybody got their hair lopped off. I remember how I cried. My mother
used to take care of my braids and, I remember, when I left her earlier that day, she
had tied an eagle plume in my hair. She said, "I want you to look nice when you get
there." She also told me, "Always remember to take care of your hair. Braid it when
you can but for sure keep it clean, comb it, tie it back. But always remember, when
you go out to pray your hair must be in braids. And I want you to keep this eagle
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The government gave Indians limited allotments of land on which to farm
and made the "surplus" land available to whites.20 Throughout it all, how-
ever, the Indians held their culture closely. Did the government ask the
Indians what they thought of these plans? No - if the families had
wanted to give up their children to the white man's education they
wouldn't have tried to hide them from the authorities who came to take
the children away.21 Once again, the white man's government operated
from the white man's perspective without considering the Indian needs
and inclinations.
Today, many Indian tribes live on reservations and some, like the Pue-
blos, maintain their own land which is not a reservation. Some tribes have
natural resources, such as uranium, on their land; others have no natural
resources. Most Indians live in relative poverty, with few economic re-
sources on the reservations. It has been asserted that
Native Americans, on the average, have the lowest per capita in-
come, the highest unemployment rate, the lowest level of educational
attainment, the shortest lives, the worst health and housing condi-
tions and the highest suicide rate in the United States. The poverty
among Indian families is nearly three times greater than the rate for
non-Indian families and Native people collectively rank at the bot-
tom of every social and economic statistical indicator.22
In an attempt to escape this extreme poverty, some tribes are taking on
industries typically considered unclean and contemptible, such as waste
dumps and gambling. The Indians, insiders on their own reservations, are
anxious to gain economic footing and are willing to undertake what other
Americans are not. States containing reservations are concerned about the
potential criminal activity and environmental hazards associated with
plume with you until we get back together." That same night they chopped off my
hair. And I mean they cut it right down to the skin. And there on the floor lay my
pretty eagle plume and the braids that my mother had so carefully fixed and tied.
That was the first atrocity I experienced at the BIA boarding school. From that room
we were marched into a shower - a big, long, common shower - and some kind of
substance was poured all over us to "delouse" us, they said. That was the second
atrocity. Then all of our clothes were taken away from us and we were all dressed in
blue coveralls. If we were wearing moccasins, those were taken away and we were all
put into government-issue black shoes. So that was my first day at the BIA boarding
school, and I shall always remember that. I will let you guess which one of those
boarding schools I loved the best.
STEVE WALL & HARVEY ARDEN, WISDOMKEEPERS: MEETING WITH NATIVE AMERICAN SPIRITUAL
ELDERS 52-55 (1990) (interview with Eddie Benton-Banai).
20. See Pommerstein, supra note 17, at 256.
21. West, supra note 11.
22. W. Richard West, Jr., From Cherokee Nation v. Georgia to the National Museum of
the American Indian: Images of Indian Culture, 15 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 409, 410-11 (1990-
91) (quoting U.S. COMM'N ON SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., FULFILLING OUR PROMISES: THE
UNITED STATES AND THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT 156 (1979)). Mr. West notes that although the
study was done in 1979, "[t]o the best of my knowledge not one of these statements has
ceased to be true during the past decade." Id. at 411.
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these pursuits. States want to regulate the reservations, and those states
with laws against gambling want those laws to apply on the reservations.
The Indians, on the other hand, want to maintain what sovereignty the
United States government allows them and to avoid the binding effects of
state laws and regulations.
The federal judiciary has decided cases on various topics concerning the
jurisdiction and sovereignty of the Indians on their reservations. So far,
the trust relationship between the federal government and the Indians
and the policy of Indian sovereignty and self-determination have allowed
the Indians to keep some of their power/jurisdiction intact. However, in
some situations the states have taken over jurisdiction, at least of those
lands belonging to non-Indians on reservations.
It is time for the tribes to have more control over their reservations.23 It
is time that the tribes are given an inside position in American jurispru-
dence. Land is the only resource available to the tribes, and the Indians
should be able to make use of the land as they see fit. Waste dumps must
go somewhere. If the Indians want waste dumps, and if, like all other
American citizens who must be licensed to do something, they show them-
selves capable of the task at hand, they should be allowed to operate waste
facilities.
The situation seems familiar enough. Take the medical field. Doctors
take the Hippocratic Oath, swearing to heal people. What a wonderful
promise! But then patients appear who don't want to be healed by modern
medicine: Christian Scientists; patients who have incurable, painful dis-
eases and want to die; or under-educated patients who are afraid the med-
ical procedures will be worse than their illnesses. Whose should be control-
ling - the doctor's or the involuntary patient's?
Likewise, who should decide what is best for the Indians? The white
man's doctor? Or the Indian elders? If the white man takes responsibility,
but the "cure" or regulations don't work, then under the white man's law,
the best route was taken and nothing can be done about it. The white man
suffers no liability for the failure. If the Indians are given responsibility,
however, and the Indians make a choice that doesn't work, will they be
held responsible because they made the "outsider" choice? Even if the In-
dians choose the white man's way, will they be held responsible for failure
because they are outsiders?
24
23. There are conflicting opinions about the Indians' ability to regulate themselves. For
example, Robert A. Williams, Jr., an Indian legal scholar who works with Indian tribes, is
not certain that Indians are prepared for the responsibilities of full domestic sovereignty.
See infra text accompanying note 131.
24. Perhaps Congress would react with "see, we knew we should not have given the Indi-
ans so much responsibility. We knew they would not be able to handle it." According to th6
Supreme Court, "[tihe sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited
character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defea-
sance." Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 323 (1978) (emphasis in Rice)). Therefore, Congress, with its "plenary power" over the
Indians, could take away the Indians' remaining sovereignty if it disagreed with the Indians'
1993] 379
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As the legal situation now exists, the Indians seem damned if they do
and damned if they don't. Below you will find legal analysis of some recent
Indian cases. As one of the Indians I've talked with said, "No one knows
what the law is!'5 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has de-
cided to treat the Indians as having environmental jurisdiction over the
entire reservation. This decision delegates federal power to the Indians; it
does not give them environmental decision-making powers over the reser-
vation. Supreme Court decisions find limited jurisdiction in other areas of
the law. The Court has yet to decide a case dealing with Indian reserva-
tion environmental regulation. But lower court cases do damn the Indians
both ways! One case says Indians have no authorization to regulate waste
on their reservation,28 while another case holds the Indians liable for the
waste despite the lack of authority and Indian arguments favoring sover-
eign immunity.
2 7
I am of the opinion, although it is not legally grounded, that the tribes
should have environmental jurisdiction. After the way the United States
has historically treated the Indians, it is time for the courts to treat them
as sovereign on the reservations. If non-members living and working on
reservations don't like tribal sovereignty, they can move their homes and
businesses elsewhere. Because of the way the judicial system treated the
Indians, however, they have nowhere else to go. The reservation land -
their home, their Mother, their earth - is all they have.
handling of a situation. See Judith V. Royster & Rory S. Fausett, Control of the Reserva-
tion Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion,
64 WASH. L. REv. 581, 587-90 (1989). For example:
[Olne of the primary tenets of the plenary power doctrine is the unilateral power of
the federal government to legislate specifically regarding native peoples, lands, and
governments, and to exercise near complete control over significant aspects of native
life.
...In stark fact, it means that congressional whim ultimately can control fully the
tribal exercise of sovereign powers. Under the ruse of plenary power, Congress can
strip tribes of specific governmental powers, force state jurisdiction onto unconsent-
ing and unwilling native governments, unilaterally abrogate native treaties, or choose
even to end the existence of tribes as federally recognized entities. Congressional ex-
ercise of its plenary power frequently is said to be subject to the restraints of the
Constitution and the federal-Indian trust doctrine, through the mechanism of judicial
review. These restraints, however, ultimately are ineffective defenses ... [and] do
not prevent Congress from acting, but only permit the subsequent remedy of money
damages in selected instances.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25. David Harrison, Executive Director, National Tribal Environmental Council, Remarks
as Allen Chair Visiting Professor at the University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of
Law (Feb. 19, 1992). Mr. Harrison is Executive Director of the National Tribal Environmen-
tal Council. The author gratefully acknowledges Mr. Harrison's help in providing research
materials that made this article possible.
26. Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
27. Blue Legs v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.D. 1987).
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You're a history buff. Do you disagree? Read on, and see how you think
the Supreme Court will decide the issue.
With much affection,
Sally
STATES AND INDIAN TRIBES: WHO CALLS THE
ENVIRONMENTAL SHOTS ON RESERVATIONS?
I. A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
A. State Concerns
States and Indian tribes alike have compelling reasons for demanding
regulatory jurisdiction over the Indian reservations' environments. Propo-
nents of state regulation argue that "[a] state's ability to coordinate a
successful and comprehensive hazardous waste management plan depends
at least in part on state control of all hazardous waste activity within its
borders. ' 28 In some states, the reservations are not isolated from the ac-
tivities and residents of the state. In Washington state, for example, some
Indian reservations have a high percentage of non-Indian residents, and
others contain cities, municipalities, and heavily industrialized areas.2 9
This "checkerboard" 30 reservation developed from the federal govern-
ment's policy to make "surplus" reservation lands not allocated to the
Indians available to non-Indians.3 ' Now, states want to avoid checker-
board environmental regulation, and Washington, for example, "fear[s]
that there would be an incentive for hazardous waste actors to locate on
reservations if they could avoid the state's more stringent standards by
doing so." 3
28. Leslie Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands?
Looking Beyond Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 72 (1987).
29. Id. at 71-72. Allen notes, for example, that
ninety-nine percent of the Puyallup Native American Reservation is owned by non-
Native Americans, tribal members having alienated all but twenty-two acres of their
18,000 acre reservation. Eighty percent of the residents of the Yakima Indian Reser-
vation and fifty percent of the residents of the Colville Reservation are non-Native
Americans. In addition, some reservation lands encompass municipalities that oper-
ate pursuant to Washington law. For example, the City of Toppenish lies within the
Yakima Indian Reservation, and much of the heavily industrialized city of Tacoma is
located within the Puyallup Indian Reservation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
30. "Checkerboard" refers to the inconsistent ownership and use of land on Indian reser-
vations. Instead of a solid block of Indian-owned land, checkerboard reservations contain
lands owned by non-Indians and even municipalities where no Indians live. For specific
examples, see supra note 29.
31. See Pommersheim, supra note 17, at 256.
32. Aller, supra note 28, at 73.
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B. Indian Concerns
Indian tribes have similar concerns and converse arguments. Washing-
ton tribes fear "that their reservations would become 'dumping grounds'
for off-reservation hazardous wastes if the state is permitted to control
the hazardous waste program on the reservations.""3 The tribes want con-
trol of the only land they have. One Indian advocate has indicated that if
the environment on the reservation becomes degraded, Indian tribes have
no means to move elsewhere.3 4 Thus, reservations, as both home and eco-
nomic base to over three hundred tribes throughout the country, must be
protected to meet both the present and future needs of the Indians.35
Reservations are important to the Indians not only for economic pur-
poses but also for preservation of the Indians' cultural and emotional at-
tachment to the land. Even in contemporary reservation life, Indian peo-
ple consider the land their Mother and find solace and nurturing there."
Much of the Indians' devotion to the land is foreign to western thought.
Still, the Indian dedication to and connection with the land is well-
known. It leads the Administrator of the EPA to call the Indians "the
country's first and arguably best stewards" of the environment. 37 From
the Indians' point of view, environmental degradation of the reservation
means further destruction of their land base.38 Since they have the great-
est interest at stake, the Indian tribes do not trust anyone but themselves
to protect the land. Therefore, they insist that the tribal governments,
33. Washington, Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985).
34. Letter from Margaret B. Crow, California Indian Legal Services, to E. Donald Elliott,
General Counsel, EPA (Dec. 10, 1990) (on file with author).
35. Id.
36. One commentator describes the Indian relationship with the land this way:
Land is inherent to Indian people; they often cannot conceive of life without it.
They are part of it and it is part of them; it is their Mother .... [I]t is a cultural
centerpiece with wide-ranging implications for any attempt to understand contempo-
rary reservation life.
The reservation is home. It is a place where the land lives and stalks people, where
the land looks after people and makes them live right, a place where the earth's ways
provide solace and nurture. Yet, paradoxically, it is also a place where the land has
been wounded and the sacred hoop has been broken; a place where there is the stain
of violence and suffering. And it is this painful dilemma that also stalks the people
and their Mother.
Pommersheim, supra note 17, at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).
37. Letter from William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA, to Michael T. Pablo, Chairman of
the Tribal Council, The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (June 19, 1989) (on file
with author).
38. EPA, Federal, Tribal and State Roles in the Protection and Regulation of Reservation
Environments 1 (policy statement, signed by EPA Administrator William K. Reilly on July
10, 1991) [hereinafter EPA, Federal, Tribal & State Roles].
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rather than state governments, be allowed to oversee and protect the res-
ervation environments. 39
C. EPA Policy
The EPA has decided to view the Indian tribes as the government enti-
ties responsible for carrying out programs affecting the Indian reserva-
tions, the reservation environments and the health and welfare of individ-
uals living there.40 Tribes must be approved on a case-by-case basis,
however. Each tribe must demonstrate competent jurisdiction over
sources of pollution on the reservation. 41 The EPA policy gives the ap-
proved tribes border-to-border jurisdiction over the entire reservation, re-
gardless of whether the land is owned by Indians or non-Indians, and
regardless of the non-Indian population on the reservation. 4' The EPA
acknowledges each state's interest in its citizens living on reservations
and the concern that reservation pollution might affect other parts of the
state.43 The agency "encourages cooperation between state, tribal and lo-
cal governments to resolve environmental issues of mutual concern.
44
II. FEDERAL INDIAN CASE LAW
Western states, where most Indian reservations are located, are op-
posed to the EPA's decision.45 Based on certain recent Supreme Court
decisions,46 the states argue that they should have authority over the
tribes. The law is very unclear, and each side has legitimate arguments in
39. Id.
40. Id. at 3.
41. See id. at 3-4. The EPA policy statement makes clear that
the Agency will view Indian reservations as single administrative units for regulatory
purposes. Hence, as a general rule, the Agency will authorize a tribal or state govern-
ment to manage reservation programs only where that government can demonstrate
adequate jurisdiction over pollution sources throughout the reservation. Where, how-
ever, a tribe cannot demonstrate jurisdiction over one or more reservation sources,
the Agency will retain enforcement primacy for those sources. Until EPA formally
authorizes a state or tribal program, the Agency retains full responsibility for pro-
gram management.
Id.
42. See Letter from B. Leigh Price, Jr., Indian Law Counsel, EPA, Region VIII, to Ren-
naxd J. Strickland, Professor, University of Oklahoma Law Center 1 (Dec. 24, 1991) (stating
that "the reservation should be regulated as a legal and administrative unit, defined by
exterior, political boundaries, and not be subdivided into Indian and non-Indian areas") (on
file with author).
43. See EPA, Federal, Tribal & State Roles, supra note 38, at 2.
44. Id. at 3.
45. See, e.g., Letter from Harley R. Harris, Montana Assistant Attorney General, to E.
Donald Elliott, General Counsel, EPA (Aug. 2, 1990) (on file with author).
46. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of
Yakima, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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support of its view. Not only is the case law ambiguous regarding the
status of tribal jurisdiction, but, as discussed below, the federal environ-
mental statutes do not treat this issue consistently.47
A. Environmental Decisions
1. Washington, Department of Ecology v. EPA
In Washington, Department of Ecology v. EPA, 8 the EPA refused to
permit Washington state to regulate Indian reservations under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA]. RCRA allows states to
implement their own waste management programs in lieu of following the
federal program.50 The statute applies to all persons' activities5 1 and in-
cludes Indians in the definition of "persons. "52
In Washington, DOE v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit found that RCRA does
not authorize the states to regulate Indians on Indian lands, but the court
did not determine whether a state could regulate non-Indians on Indian
land.53 The statute does not state, nor does legislative history indicate,
whether the states may enforce hazardous waste regulations against In-
dian tribes.54 The Ninth Circuit deferred to the federal agency decision,
reasoning that since the statute was silent on the issue, the court must
defer to the rational construction of the agency charged with administer-
ing the statute.5 5 By virtue of the gap in RCRA, Congress had implicitly
delegated the policy-making authority to the EPA. 6
A court must defer to an administrative agency as long as the agency's
construction of the statute is reasonable, even though there may be other
reasonable interpretations. 57 Citing Chevron, Inc., v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Ninth Circuit noted that deference to the agency is
particularly important when ordinary knowledge of the regulations' sub-
47. See Amanda K. Wilson, Hazardous & Solid Waste Dumping Grounds Under RCRA's
Indian Law Loophole, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1043, 1065-68 (1990) (discussing model stat-
utes for amendments to RCRA); Royster & Fausett, supra note 24, at 614-28 (discussing
authority of "states" and how the Indian tribes fit in federal environmental statutes).
48. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985). For a good discussion of this case, see Wilson, supra
note 47, at 1061-63.
49. Washington, Department of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1466. RCRA is codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6991i (1988).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6926.
51. See id. § 6928.
52. See id. § 6903(13), (15).
53. Washington, Department of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1467-68.
54. Id. at 1469.
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ject matter is insufficient to fully understand the statutory policies. 58 Fol-
lowing this logic, the reasonable interpretations of EPA should always
win out over the reasonable interpretations of the states, given that the
EPA is the expert in the field of environmental protection. Therefore, as
long as the EPA continues to support the Indian tribes' stewardship of
the reservation environments, and Congress makes no changes to the
statute, Indian tribes should be assured that states will not be given envi-
ronmental jurisdiction over the reservations.
The Ninth Circuit also found in Washington, Department of Ecology
v. EPA that well-settled federal Indian law principles supported EPA's
interpretation of RCRA. For example, absent clear congressional intent,
"[s]tates are generally precluded from exercising jurisdiction over Indians
in Indian country." 59 The federal government plays a fiduciary role in
protecting Indian rights from state intrusions,"0 and Indian tribes have a
long tradition of sovereignty."' Finally, ambiguous statutes must be
weighed against the "'backdrop' of tribal sovereignty,' 2 particularly
when the statute concerns an area in which federal policy supports tribal
sovereignty or where tribes traditionally have exercised their sovereign
powers.6
3
These well-settled principles of Indian law seem to provide the Indians
strong protection against state intrusion,64 particularly where, as in this
case, the principles are combined with the Chevron deference to agency
doctrine that also protects the tribes from intrusion. The principles lack
the strength, however, to automatically garner the tribes' regulatory au-
thority under RCRA. Although the Ninth Circuit denied Washington
state regulatory authority over the tribes, it did not give the tribes au-
thority under RCRA to regulate the reservations. Instead, the court held
that the EPA retained authority over the Indian reservations. 5
58. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,
382 (1961))).
59. Id. at 1469-70 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976); McClana-
han v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1973)).
60. Id. at 1470. The tribes fear their reservations will become "dumping grounds" for
Washington's hazardous waste if the state controls reservation waste programs. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719 (1983)).
63. Id.
64. But see cases cited supra note 13 (whittling away the protections of the Marshall
trilogy).
65. Washington, Department of Ecology, 752 F.2d at 1472.
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2. Blue Legs v. EPA
In a 1987 federal district court case, Blue Legs v. EPA,66 the court held
that implementation of RCRA regulations for nonhazardous waste was
not the direct responsibility of the EPA but of the tribe.6 7 The court dis-
tinguished Washington, Department of Ecology v. EPA", on the ground
that Washington, Department of Ecology involved hazardous waste, 9 for
which Title III of RCRA explicitly required implementation of a program
by the EPA."° With regard to nonhazardous waste under Title IV of the
Act, however, the Blue Legs court found that the EPA has no congressio-
nally granted authority over open dumping.71 Instead, the Indian tribe
itself regulates open dumping through tribal ordinances created by the
tribal council. 2 Thus, the court in Blue Legs interpreted RCRA as hold-
ing the tribe responsible for preventing open dumping on tribal lands. 3
3. Resulting Confusion
The dichotomy between Washington, Department of Ecology and Blue
Legs seems strained. The Blue Legs court distinguished the cases on the
basis of the type of trash dumped, interpreting RCRA to require Indian
tribes to maintain responsibility for nonhazardous waste and the EPA to
govern procedures for handling hazardous waste on reservations.7 "4 The
line between hazardous and nonhazardous waste is not so clear; however
any type of waste can be potentially harmful to human health or the en-
vironment.75 Arguably, the waste management industry's knowledge of
how "nonhazardous" wastes break down and combine with one another in
nonhazardous waste sites is not sufficiently advanced to say absolutely
that certain wastes pose hazards and others do not. In light of this uncer-
tainty, the decisions to hold Indians liable for some forms of waste but to
deny them the authority to regulate other forms of waste appear to be
arbitrary and patronizing.
66. 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.D. 1987).
67. Id. at 1341.
68. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
69. Blue Legs, 668 F. Supp. at 1338-39.
70. Id. at 1339.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1341.
74. For an excellent article on the application of RCRA to Indian reservations, see Wil-
son, supra note 47.
75. RCRA defines hazardous waste as waste that may 1) materially contribute to a rise in
mortality or increase in certain serious or incapacitating illnesses or 2) pose a significant
present or potential threat to the environment or human health when improperly managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
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B. Non-Environmental Decisions
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide any case address-
ing the question of Indian jurisdiction over environmental issues on the
reservation. The Supreme Court has, however, analyzed several issues in
recent years concerning the power of Indian tribes to regulate non-mem-
ber residents of the reservation in the areas of hunting and fishing on
non-Indian fee land,"6 criminal activities," and zoning." These Supreme
Court cases have tended to diminish the Indian tribes' sovereign powers
over non-members on non-Indian fee land. Some observers and officials in
western states believe that this erosion of Indian sovereignty indicates
that the Supreme Court will not recognize Indian border-to-border envi-
ronmental jurisdiction on reservations.79 Indian tribes and the EPA, on
the other hand, believe that the fact-specific nature of these cases, the
continuing federal policy of Indian self-government and the Chevron rule
of deference to the federal agency together indicate that the Supreme
Court will allow the Indians to have border-to-border environmental ju-
risdiction on the reservations."
1. Montana v. United States
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Montana v. United States,8' a
case concerning the power of Indian tribes to regulate hunting and fishing
by non-members on reservation land owned by non-members."2 Montana
v. United States contains several notable observations by the Court.
First, absent specific congressional delegation, tribal authority is limited
to protection of tribal self-government and control of internal affairs.8 3
76. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
77. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
78. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
79. See, e.g., Peter W. Sly, EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual Ap-
proach, 20 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,429 (1990); see also Letter from Duane Woodard, Attorney
General, State of Colorado, to Thomas A. Speicher, Regional Counsel, EPA, Region VIII
(Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author) (asserting that Brendale is quite applicable to environ-
mental regulatory matters).
80. See Regulatory Jurisdiction of Indian Tribes, 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876 (1991) [hereinafter
Reg. Jur. of Indian Tribes] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131) (legal analysis of the EPA
published in the Preamble to the Indian Reservation Water Quality Standards Regulation);
Letter from B. Leigh Price, Jr., Indian Law Counsel, EPA, Region VIII, to Rennard J.
Strickland, Professor, University of Oklahoma Law Center (Dec. 24, 1991) (on file with au-
thor); Letter from Richard A. Du Bey, Environmental Counsel, The Puyallup Tribe of Indi-
ans, to E. Donald Elliott, Assistant Administrator and General Counsel, EPA (Jan. 23, 1991)
(on file with author); Letter from Margaret B. Crow, California Indian Legal Services, to E.
Donald Elliott, General Counsel, EPA (Dec. 10, 1990) (on file with author).
81. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
82. Id. at 547.
83. The Court stated the "exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
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Next, the Court stated that inherent tribal sovereign powers generally do
not cover the activities of non-members. 4 The Court found exceptions to
this general proposition, however, in that "tribes retain inherent sover-
eign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians
on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.""5 For example,
tribes may regulate non-member activities that involve the tribe or its
members, such as contractual agreements, leases, commercial dealings,
etc.", A tribe may also have civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-
members when the conduct threatens "the political integrity, the eco-
nomic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. '8 7
States might argue that the first of these points indicates that without
specific authority given to Indians in federal environmental statutes, even
the EPA cannot confer regulatory power over the reservations on the
tribes. On the other hand, the environmental integrity of the reservation
affects the health and welfare of the tribe, as well as its economic secur-
ity, since the reservation includes only a finite amount of land that holds
all the Indians' natural resources. Furthermore, in light of the Indians'
cultural attachment to the land, any threat to their reservation is a threat
to their tribal identity as well.
A non-member wishing to build a nuclear reactor or a hazardous waste
facility on non-member fee land on the reservation might enter into com-
mercial or contractual relations with the tribe by procuring supplies or
employing tribal members. The non-member's project creates a potential
threat to the health and welfare of the tribe. Under these circumstances,
the Montana v. United States observations indicate that the Indians
should have environmental jurisdiction over the entire reservation.
2. Duro v. Reina
In 1990, in Duro v. Reina,s s the Supreme Court addressed a more direct
intrusion on individual liberties 8 than the hunting and fishing rights is-
sue presented in Montana v. United States. In this criminal case, a non-
member" living on the reservation shot and killed a member of the tribe
within the reservation borders. 1 The Court found that Indians, by virtue
of their "dependent" status, are not full sovereigns and therefore cannot
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation." Id. at
564.
84. Id. at 565.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 566.
88. 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
89. Id. at 693.
90. This individual was a member of another tribe.
91. Duro, 495 U.S. at 679.
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enforce their laws against everyone entering their territory.92 Rather,
tribes have only "the retained sovereignty .. .needed to control their
own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and so-
cial order. '9 3
The Court also made clear, however, that it still recognizes broader tri-
bal powers outside the arena of criminal law. 4 It is only in the context of
criminal enforcement that tribal power does not extend beyond internal
relations among tribal members.9 5 Thus, while the criminal context
sharply curtails the tribes' jurisdiction over non-members on the reserva-
tion, Duro does not diminish tribal powers over non-criminal issues.
. To the extent that environmental problems raise criminal issues, the
Duro decision may curtail tribal environmental jurisdiction. However,
when criminal activities are not involved in environmental issues, Duro
should not restrict the power of Indian tribes observed above in the Mon-
tana v. United States discussion. In fact, even with criminal environmen-
tal laws, the Chevron rule of deference to the federal agency and the po-
tential impact of environmental crimes upon the health and welfare of
the tribe may outweigh the Duro considerations. Thus, the Supreme
Court could find that tribes have jurisdiction even in cases involving envi-
ronmentally related criminal activities.
3. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
& Bands of Yakima. 96 This case has generated much controversy and has
added to the confusion in Indian law.97 Brendale involved different zon-
ing by the Yakima Nation and Yakima County for the same parcels of
land on the Yakima reservation. The Yakima Nation challenged the
county's authority to zone on the reservation. Some of the challenged
zoning involved Indian-owned land; other zoning involved non-member
fee land on the reservation." The Yakima Nation sought a declaratory
judgment that the tribe had exclusive authority to zone the properties in
question.99
The Supreme Court could not garner a majority opinion in Brendale,
and a divided Court found that the tribe had authority to zone in the
tribal area of the reservation. The Court determined that the county had
92. Id. at 686.
93. Id. at 685-86.
94. Id. at 687.
95. Id. at 688.
96. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
97. "The law after Brendale is an absolute muddle!" See Harrison, supra note 25.
98. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 408.
99. Id. at 419.
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authority to zone in the primarily non-member area of the reservation. 10 0
While zoning may be best controlled by the particular community that
defines the character of that part of the reservation, environmental
threats to health and welfare will never be delimited by demography and
should continue to fall within the Montana v. United States guidelines
for tribal jurisdiction.
Justice Stevens wrote the controversial opinion in Brendale which fo-
cused on the demography of the reservation and asked whether the tribe
had "the power to define the essential character of the territory."101 In
the area of the reservation reserved solely for members of the tribe,l02
Justice Stevens found that the tribe did have an interest in the character
of the land and could zone there.10 3 In the open area, however, the aliena-
tion of part of the property had created "an integrated community [not]
economically or culturally delimited by reservation boundaries." 104 There-
fore, the tribe's zoning interest in restraining inconsistent uses was sub-
stantially reduced.105
The EPA believes that since Brendale lacked a majority rationale, its
primary significance is in its result. 0 Brendale stands for the proposition
that in a zoning matter, where the political and economic status and the
health and welfare of the tribe are not threatened, there is no tribal juris-
diction over non-member lands.' The EPA asserts that this result is
consistent with and does not overrule the Montana v. United States pro-
nouncement of tribal jurisdiction when conduct threatens the political
and economic integrity or health and welfare of the tribe. 08
III. IMPACT OF NON-ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS ON TRIBAL JURISDICTION
Those who argue for state environmental jurisdiction over reservations
believe that Brendale further undermines the tribes' sovereignty on the
reservations. By focusing on the character of the land, and on whether
100. Id. at 444-45. See generally Reg. Jur. of Indian Tribes, supra note 80 at 64,876 (argu-
ing that Brendale is consistent with Montana v. United States).
101. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 444-45.
102. The Supreme Court opinions referred to this as the "closed area." The closed area
has been closed to the general public at least since 1972 when the Bureau of Indian
Affairs restricted the use of federally maintained roads in the area to members of the
Yakima Nation and to its permittees, who must be record land owners or associated
with the Tribe. Access to the open area, as its name suggests, is not likewise re-
stricted to the general public.
Id. at 415-16 (White, J.).
103. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., concurring).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 445.
106. Reg. Jur. of Indian Tribes, supra note 80, at 64,877.
107. See id. at 64,878.
108. See id. at 64,877-78.
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the land is more Indian or non-Indian in character, the supporters of
state environmental jurisdiction argue that Brendale overrides the second
Montana v. United States exception. The Montana exception provides
for tribal jurisdiction over non-member activity "when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."'1 9 The proponents of state
jurisdiction argue that if an area of the reservation has lost its tribal char-
acter, the exception no longer applies. 110
Tribes and the EPA, on the other hand, believe that Brendale and -
Duro address the exercise of naked inherent tribal power, while the envi-
ronmental issue concerns the implementation programs authorized by
federal statute and supported by long-standing federal policy fostering
tribal sovereignty."' In a slightly different vein, those in favor of tribal
jurisdiction note that in the provisions of certain federal environmental
statutes, such as the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and
the Clean Air Act, the federal government has explicitly delegated to In-
dian tribes the authority to regulate the environment throughout the res-
ervation. 1" Ownership interest of land is not a factor under these Acts.
Indeed, the delegation of power was not relevant to or limited by the
tribes' inherent powers with which the Court dealt in Brendale."' From
this observation it follows that Congress also intended to delegate regula-
tory authority to tribes under other environmental statutes, regardless of
any limitations on the inherent powers of tribal government.
The EPA itself continues to support Indian tribal sovereignty finding
Brendale to hold that a notable distinction exists between water quality
management and land use planning."4 The Supreme Court has explicitly
acknowledged this distinction, observing that while land use planning
mandates certain uses for land, environmental regulation directs only.
that harm to the environment be maintained within prescribed limits,
without regard to how the land is used." 5 Based on this distinction,
greater tribal power would be required to zone property than to regulate
the environment. If this is the case, then Brendale deals with a higher
level of sovereign power than that required for environmental jurisdiction
109. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1980).
110. See, e.g., Letter from Duane Woodard, Attorney General, State of Colorado to
Thomas A. Speicher, Regional Counsel, EPA, Region VIII (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with the
author).
111. Letter from Margaret B. Crow, California Indian Legal Services, to E. Donald Elli-
ott, General Counsel, EPA (Dec. 10, 1990) (on file with author).
112. Letter from Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman, Select Committee on Indian Af-
fairs, to William K. Reilly, Administrator, EPA (Dec. 18, 1990) (on file with author).
113. Id.
114. Reg. Jur. of Indian Tribes, supra note 80, at 64,879.
115. Id. (quoting California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 587
(1987)).
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and therefore has no legal impact on the tribes' power to regulate the
environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the EPA's concern with pollution and its effects on the envi-
ronment, it is not surprising that the EPA supports the Indian tribes as
the regulatory agents governing reservations. The EPA has promised to
protect the Indian reservation environments to the same extent that it
protects the rest of the country, '16 and the Indians have the greatest in-
terest in seeing that their reservations are well protected. The EPA recog-
nizes the practical difficulties of permitting the states to regulate non-
member reservation lands while the tribes regulate member lands. The
mobile nature of pollution makes this arrangement ineffective and unde-
sirable.' The EPA embraces the traditional concept of tribal self-gov-
ernment and therefore views the tribal governments as the appropriate
non-federal entities for environmental decision-making on the reserva-
tions.11 8 However, the EPA will continue to be guided by federal Indian
law, EPA Indian policy, and its own responsibility to protect human
health and the environment. '1 9
There seems to be no definitive answer as to how the Supreme Court
will decide the issue of tribal environmental jurisdiction. Existing Indian
law is too jumbled to answer whether the Court will emphasize the "de-
pendent nation" status of the tribes and deny environmental jurisdiction,
or will allow Indian jurisdiction based on the doctrine of inherent tribal
sovereignty and the federal policy of Indian self-government. As the
above cases indicate, there has been a trend toward diminishing tribal
sovereign rights, seemingly to protect the non-members living on reserva-
tions and to ensure that their rights under non-Indian laws are pro-
tected. 2 ' However, the tribes and their supporters have strong arguments
in their favor for border-to-border environmental jurisdiction. A western
state is likely to challenge the EPA soon.1 21 If the Supreme Court decides
116. EPA, Federal, Tribal & State Roles, supra note 38, at 1.
117. See Reg. Jur. of Indian Tribes, supra note 80, at 64, 878.
118. EPA, Federal, Tribal & State Roles, supra note 38, at 3.
119. Id. at 4.
120. A restrictive approach by the Court to protect non-members demonstrates flawed
logic. The reservations were provided to the Indians as a homeland for them to govern as
sovereign domestic dependents. Non-members who choose to live on the reservations should
have to obey tribal laws, just as Americans who choose to live in a particular state must
follow that state's laws. Non-members can choose to move away from the reservation to a
more sympathetic state government. The tribe cannot leave the reservation and should be
allowed to govern the land within the United States Constitution and federal laws.
121. Letter from B. Leigh Price, Jr., Indian Law Counsel, EPA, Region VIII, to Rennard
J. Strickland, Professor, University of Oklahoma Law Center 2 (Dec. 24, 1991) (on file with
author).
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to grant certiorari, an answer to tribal environmental jurisdiction will
soon be forthcoming.
Dear Aunt
Since I last wrote to you, my friends and I have met yet another remark-
able Indian122 in our study of Indians and the environment. Robert Wil-
liams has studied and written extensively about the legal ideas which the
Europeans brought to this country and their ensuing racist notions of the
cultural inferiority of the Indian people.2 3 He traces the problem to the
Crusades and the Christian justification for battles with heathens and in-
fidels. The Christians believed that heathens had no rights -- they could
not hold property because they had no knowledge of God and therefore
could not experience the grace of God.1 24 Europeans brought these notions
of superiority with them to the new world and treated the Indians the
same way.
While members of the "Indian Law Establishment" litigate Indian cases
under the arguably racist laws handed down by the Marshall trilogy which
hailed the doctrines of discovery and conquest, critical race scholars be-
lieve that such practice only perpetuates and legitimizes a racist doc-
trine. 1 25 Critical race scholars argue that federal government Indian poli-
cies have been intended to destroy Indian culture1 26 - which has been
termed "'genocide at law.' 27 President Theodore Roosevelt, for example,
called the General Allotment Act of 1887 "a mighty pulverizing engine to
break up the tribal mass. It acts directly upon the family and the individ-
ual. 1 28 This and other federal Indian laws sought to destroy Indian cul-
ture in order to make the Indians behave more like the white man.
The more I read and learn about the white man's historical treatment of
the Indians, the more reasonable the critical race scholars' point of view
seems. The Eurocentric white man's jurisprudence does tend to "pulver-
ize" the culture and rights of outsiders. Even when the white man's juris-
prudence professes to help the outsiders, it seldom asks what outsiders
want or need. Witness the disasters of the General Allotment Act and the
122. The students in the "Toxic Waste in the Indian Community" class at the University
of Richmond Law School were very fortunate to meet with Rick West, David Harrison,
Paula Gunn Allen, and finally Rob Williams. The author owes many thanks to Professor
Nancy Collins for organizing this singular opportunity and to the George K. Allen family for
its Chair endowment that made it possible for these Native Americans to visit.
123. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
WXis. L. REv. 219.
124. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Remarks as Allen Chair Visiting Professor at the University
of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law (Apr. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Williams, Remarks].
See generally Williams, supra note 123.
125. Williams, Remarks, supra note 124 (Apr. 8, 1992).
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Rennard J. Strickland, Professor, University of Oklahoma Law Center).
128. Pommersheim, supra note 17, at 255 (quoting S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY
104 (1973)).
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Indian Reorganization Act. The Indians who were not farmers did not
want to become farmers. Allotted lands and voting districts were drawn
without consideration of Indian community locations, but Indians did not
want to leave or vote outside of their established communities.
Could the white man's intentions have been honorable? Perhaps he sin-
cerely believed that assimilation into the Euro-American life was in the
Indian's best interest. But patriarchy of this sort is the entire problem. If
the white man had allowed the tribes to maintain their freedom and way
of life, the Indians' problems might be nonexistent today. Outsiders should
not be forced to become insiders before they can gain the respect of those
in power.
Some members of Congress knew this long ago. An 1880 minority report
of the House Indian Affairs Committee warned that passage of the Gen-
eral Allotment Act was unprincipled. The report stated with great insight:
The real aim . . . is to get at the Indian lands and open them up
to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the Indian
are but the pretext to get at the lands and occupy them. . . .If this
were done in the name of Greed, it would be bad enough; but to do it
in the name of Humanity, and under the cloak of an ardent desire to
promote the Indian's welfare by making him like ourselves, whether
he will or not, is infinitely worse.12 9
Either insufficient numbers of congressmen read this report, or the inten-
tions of the white man were not honorable. "Honorable intentions" based
on this minority report's insight would never have passed the General Al-
lotment Act.
Even though my experience with critical race Indian scholarship has
been an affirming one, I am also disheartened by the prospects for Indian
sovereignty in our world of unyielding white man's jurisprudence. Even
some of the "Indian Law Establishment" lawyers have become disillu-
sioned in the wake of the Brendale decision. Rick West, another of our
Indian mentors, stated that "[i]n explanation of why this Indian lawyer
has become a museum director, I guess the most accurate thing to say is
that I have given up, at least for the moment, on the Supreme Court."130
Even worse, as Rob Williams pointed out, many Indian tribes, their sys-
tems of government still in turmoil from the Indian Reorganization Act
upheaval, may not be ready for environmental and toxic waste disposal
responsibility.1"' This possibility wreaks havoc upon my thesis that we
must stop patronizing the Indians and give them free reign as sovereigns
on the reservations. Perhaps I have jumped the gun with my suggestions.
Furthermore, once the tribal governments are prepared for environmen-
tal responsibility, under existing law, they would not have true environ-
129. Id. at 257-58 (quoting DELOS S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN
LANDS 19 (1973)).
130. West, supra note 22, at 417.
131. Williams, Remarks, supra note 124 (Apr. 8, 1992).
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mental decision-making power over their reservation. They would only
have power delegated by the federal government to implement and regu-
late in accordance with the federal environmental laws. Still, there is no
complete sovereignty for the Indians. .
To top it all off, Williams argues that existing Indian law, beginning
with the Marshall trilogy, should be thrown out, just like Brown v. Board
of Education of Topeka132 threw out notions of "separate but equal."1 3 3 My
first letter dismissed this notion, saying there was no going back at this
late date. But now, with Williams' serious suggestion, I must face the un-
welcome fact that reversal of the Marshall trilogy could mean that the In-
dians would have claim to my house and yard. On the other hand, if rever-
sal impacted present legal controversies only and did not affect my
property, I would welcome it enthusiastically.




I haven't come up with any answers to the problems I presented to you
in my last letter, but I do feel better than I did about the issues.
At least five distinct legal decisions could affect Indian sovereignty.
First, as Rob Williams suggested, the Supreme Court could reverse the
Marshall trilogy and make the reversal retroactive throughout American
history. Second, treaties which have been unconstitutionally terminated
could be reactivated,134 with Indians receiving all which was theirs under
those treaties.35 Third, starting with the present, the Supreme Court
could decide to give Indians total sovereignty over criminal, environmen-
tal, and land use planning issues on the reservations, denying Congress
plenary power to control the tribes. Fourth, the Supreme Court could de-
termine that tribes have environmental sovereignty on the reservations to
implement and regulate the environment through the powers delegated by
the EPA and perhaps even total sovereignty to make environmental deci-
sions regardless of the federal statutory requirements. Fifth, the Supreme
Court could decide that everything will remain as it is - the confusing
status quo remains the status quo.
The first two possibilities seem very unlikely. Even if the Supreme Court
were willing to reach these conclusions, sorting out land ownership and the
ensuing myriad of property suits would likely prove to be impossible un-
dertakings..In light of the tremendous problems these suggestions would
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. Williams, Remarks, supra note 124 (Apr. 8, 1992).
134. For example, perhaps the Supreme Court would determine that Congress has no ple-
nary power to unfairly terminate treaties.
135. See generally Churchill & LaDuke, supra note 18, at 96 (discussing land taken away
from Indians by legislation and violation of treaty rights).
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present, however, the third and fourth suggestions suddenly look much
more appealing.
But would the Supreme Court take one of these steps? There remains
the difficult question of whether the tribal governments are ready for sov-
ereignty, whether full and complete or merely environmental. And as
usual, there is the nagging question: who is the white man to decide
whether the Indians are ready? Will Indians never escape from beneath
the white man's thumb?
It occurs to me that perhaps the Indian tribes are more patient with this
sovereignty problem than I am. Paula Gunn Allen, with her "poet's ap-
proach from a tribal mode of inquiry,""13 told us that to Indians, "harmony
and balance is justice. Various things happen, and then we learn some-
thing." '3 It's as simple as that. When harm or adversity arises, the Indian
does not automatically pursue resolution or compensation. Pain is a part
of life from which Indians learn; it is not harmful in itself.138 Paula Gunn
Allen also reminded us that "new life always begins in pain, but goes on to
be profoundly creative."'' 9 Maybe what the Indians and their advocates
currently endure is the painful, difficult birth of a new era of Indian law,
which will turn out well for them. Maybe, after various things happen, in-
sider jurisprudence will learn something about the outsiders: to respect
differences, and that no formal resolution of differences is required for eve-
rybody to live happily ever after.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will eventually expand its jurisprudence to
include outsiders. In the meantime, there is one more suggestion for In-
dian advocates: the place to begin helping the Indians is in the reservation
communities. Finding out what Indians want and implementing their
agenda are the keys to empowering the Indians.'4 0 Those of us who proba-
bly will not go to the reservations can help too, by talking about what we
have learned and encouraging others to think about the problems the In-
dian people face. The more people who know and consider the issues, the
more likely solutions to sovereignty and other problems will be found.
At least one Indian, however, knows that sovereignty and empowerment
must begin with himself. This must be the best solution to the problems. If
the Indians regain a glow of pride in their culture and their sense of self-
determination, the federal government will be bound to notice. The gov-
ernment cannot deny a sovereignty that is manifestly there.
136. Paula Gunn Allen, Professor of English, University of California at Los Angeles, Re-
marks as Allen Chair visiting Professor at the University of Richmond, T.C. Williams
School of Law'(Mar. 25, 1992) (describing her perspective as a Laguna Indian/poet) [herein-
after Allen, Remarks].
137. Id.
138. Pain is not, however, an acceptable part of life in the white man's world. Instead of
seeking harmony and balance and learning from pain as Indians do, the white man's judicial
system encourages compensation for pain and resolution of conflict by strict laws. This
method of justice seldom results in harmony and balance between opposing sides.
139. Allen, Remarks, supra note 136.
140. Williams, Remarks, supra note 124 (Apr. 15, 1992).
[Vol. 27:371
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
I leave you with Eddie Benton-Banai's answer to the question, "what is
sovereignty?":
Personally, I'm sovereign. I'm not dependent on anybody. For thir-
teen years I was a high-steel construction man. I did that very well
and I loved it. It satisfied something in my ego and my manhood.
But then, after I'd put up hundreds of towers and skyscrapers and
bridges, I looked around and saw that no skyscrapers were being
built on the reservation. I said, 'Hey, this ain't doin' my people any
good.' So I climbed down off the iron and picked up the flag of self-
determination. Then I had to learn how to make my family sover-
eign, how to make my people sovereign. Sovereignty is something
that goes in ever-widening circles, beginning with yourself. In order
for Indian people to attain sovereignty, each of us has to be sover-
eign in ourselves. If a person can go out into the stream and fish for
their needs, if they can do whatever they have to do to provide for
those who are dependent on them, then that person is sovereign.
Sovereignty isn't something someone gives you. You can't give us our
sovereignty. Sovereignty isn't a privilege someone gives you. It's a
responsibility you carry inside yourself. In order for my people to
achieve sovereignty, each man and woman among us has to be sover-




141. WALL & ARDEN, supra note 19, at 51.
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